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Large operational losses as a result of accounting scandals, insider
fraud, and rogue trading, to name just a few, have received increasing at-
tention from the press, the public, and policymakers. The frequency of se-
vere losses, with more than 100 instances of losses at ﬁnancial institutions
exceeding $100 million, has caused many ﬁnancial institutions to try to ex-
plicitly model operational risk to determine their own economic capital.
As ﬁnancial institutions have begun to comprehensively collect loss data
and use it to manage operational risk, bank regulators have increased their
expectations for measuring and modeling operational risk. Under the cur-
rent U.S. rules proposal for implementing the Basle Accord, large, inter-
nationally active banks will be expected to use internal models to estimate
capital for unexpected operational losses. A criticism of this proposal has
been that the tools for modeling operational risk are in their infancy, mak-
ing estimating capital problematic.
This paper uses data supplied by six large, internationally active banks
to determine if the regularities in the loss data will make consistent model-
ing of operational losses possible. We ﬁnd that there are similarities in the
results of models of operational loss across institutions, and that our re-
sults are consistent with publicly reported operational risk capital esti-
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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, or those of the Federal Reserve System.We begin the analysis by considering tail plots of each bank’s loss data
by business line and event type. Three ﬁndings clearly emerge from this de-
scriptive analysis.1 First, loss data for most business lines and event types
may be well modeled by a Pareto-type distribution, as most of the tail plots
are linear when viewed on a log-log scale. Second, the severity ranking of
event types is consistent across institutions. Clients, products, and business
practices is the highest severity event type, while external fraud and em-
ployment practices are the lowest severity event types. Third, the tail plots
suggest that losses for certain business lines and event types are very heavy
tailed. This last ﬁnding highlights that while basic measurement ap-
proaches such as the tail plot are easy to implement and are intuitively ap-
pealing, overly simplistic approaches may yield implausible estimates of
economic capital. A main contribution of this paper is to show how quan-
titative modeling can result in more plausible conclusions regarding tail
thickness and economic capital.
We next attempt to model the distribution of loss amounts using a “full-
data” approach, whereby one ﬁts all of the available loss data with a para-
metric severity distribution. We consider nine commonly used distribu-
tions, four of which are light-tailed and ﬁve of which are heavy-tailed. We
ﬁt each of these distributions by business line and event type at each of the
six institutions considered. The heavy-tailed distributions provide consis-
tently good ﬁts to the loss data, which conﬁrms our ﬁndings based on vi-
sual inspection of the tail plots. The light-tailed distributions do not gen-
erally provide good ﬁts. However, we ﬁnd that some parameter estimates
for the heavy-tailed distributions can have implausible implications for
both tail thickness and economic capital.
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) is an alternative to the full-data approach
that is increasingly being explored by researchers, by ﬁnancial institutions,
and by their regulators. However, it is well-known that EVT techniques
yield upward-biased tail estimates in small samples. Huisman, Koedijk,
Kool, and Palm (2001) have proposed a regression-based EVT technique
that corrects for small-sample bias in the tail parameter estimate. Applying
their technique (hereafter HKKP) to the six banks in our sample, we ob-
tain estimates that are both plausible and consistent with earlier estimates
using purely external data (de Fontnouvelle et al., 2003).
It is important to stress that the statistical analysis of operational loss
data is a new ﬁeld, and that this paper’s results should be viewed as pre-
liminary. This is particularly true given that we only have data for one year
from each bank. The paper also raises several technical issues that should
be addressed in future research as a longer time series becomes available.
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1. Suppose one has a series of observations (xi) with a cumulative empirical distribution
function denoted by F(x). A tail plot is obtained by plotting log(1 – F[xi]) on the vertical axis
against log(xi) on the horizontal axis.The most signiﬁcant such issue is that even though the data appear to be
heavy-tailed, we cannot formally reject the hypothesis that they are drawn
from a light-tailed distribution, such as the lognormal. To investigate this
possibility, we propose a threshold analysis of the lognormal distribution
that, to our knowledge, is new to this subject. This technique also provides
a reasonable characterization of the tail behavior of operational losses.
We also examine the frequency of operational losses. We consider both
the Poisson distribution and the Negative Binomial distribution as poten-
tial models for the number of losses that a bank could incur over the course
of one year. Using Monte Carlo simulation to combine the frequency and
severity distributions, we obtain an estimate for the distribution of total
annual operational losses. The quantiles of this aggregate loss distribution
are interpreted as economic capital estimates for operational risk. These
estimates should be viewed with several signiﬁcant cautions. First, we are
assuming that the data are complete: however, banks have moved to more
comprehensive data collection platforms, which may improve the loss cap-
ture. Second, we are only using internal data for one year, and banks will
be required to have three years of comprehensive data. Third, analysis of
internal loss data will not be the sole determinant of capital for operational
risk; banks will also be required to demonstrate that their risk estimates 
reﬂect exposures that are not captured in internal loss data.2 Given these
qualiﬁcations, the estimates should be viewed as a preliminary indication
(and most probably a lower bound) for the amount of capital needed.
Despite these caveats, the estimates implied by the modeling of the in-
ternal loss data are consistent with capital estimates using purely external
data (de Fontnouvelle et al., 2003). The results imply that for a variety of
plausible assumptions regarding the frequency and severity of operational
losses, the level of capital needed for operational risk for the typical (me-
dian) bank in our sample would be equivalent to 5–9 percent of the bank’s
current minimum regulatory capital requirement. This range also seems
consistent with the 12–15 percent of minimum regulatory capital that most
banks are currently allocating to operational risk, given that the banks’
models tend to have a broader set of model inputs than those used in this
analysis, including external data, scenarios, and qualitative risk assess-
ments.3 Our results thus conﬁrm that operational risk is a material risk
faced by ﬁnancial institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
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2. The proposed Basel Accord requires banks to measure losses to which they are exposed,
but that have not actually occurred (via analysis of scenarios and external data). Banks would
also be required to measure exposures that have arisen since the data collection period (via
analysis of business environment and control factors).
3. See page 26 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). Given the uncertainties
in evaluating the relative merits of diﬀerent techniques and estimators using only limited data,
we would consider results to be consistent if they are within an order of magnitude of each
other.(10.2) provides a description of the data. Section 10.3 reviews related liter-
ature on the measurement of operational risk in ﬁnancial institutions. Sec-
tion 10.4 discusses some commonly used continuous distributions, and
discusses their potential relevance to modeling the severity of operational
losses. Section 10.5 presents visual analyses of the loss data, and draws pre-
liminary conclusions regarding which distributions may be appropriate for
modeling loss severity. Section 10.6 explores full-data approaches to mod-
eling operational losses, and formally compares the alternative severity dis-
tributions. Section 10.7 explores EVT-based approaches to modeling the
loss data. Section 10.8 compares alternative frequency distributions. Sec-
tion 10.9 provides the implied capital numbers from estimating diﬀerent
loss distributions using Monte Carlo simulations. The ﬁnal section provides
conclusions on using these techniques for quantifying operational risk.
10.2 Data
The 2002 Operational Risk Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE) was
initiated by the Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision in June 2002. The LDCE asked participating
banks to provide information on individual operational losses exceeding
€10,000 during 2001, among various other data items. Banks were also
asked to indicate whether their loss data were complete. The LDCE data
include 47,269 operational loss events reported by eighty-nine banks from
nineteen countries in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Aus-
tralasia. For additional information and summary statistics regarding the
LDCE, readers can refer to Risk Management Group (2003).
Based on the information provided in the LDCE, and on our knowledge
of the banks involved, we identiﬁed a list of institutions whose data sub-
missions seem relatively complete. Due to practical considerations, we
limit our sample to loss data from six of these banks. This paper presents
results for these six banks on a bank-by-bank basis (with the exception of
the operational risk exposure ﬁgures reported in table 10.5). However, the
results are presented in a way that makes it impossible to identify the indi-
vidual banks. Focusing on a cross-sectional study of banks enables us to
determine whether the same statistical techniques and distributions apply
across institutions that may have very diﬀerent business mixes and risk ex-
posures.
The LDCE categorizes losses into eight business lines and seven event
types. To protect the conﬁdentiality of banks participating in the LDCE,
we present results only for those business lines and event types when three
or more banks reported suﬃcient data to support analysis. The business
lines presented are: trading and sales, retail banking, payment and settle-
ment, and asset management. The loss types presented are: internal fraud,
external fraud, employment practices and workplace safety, clients, prod-
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ment.4
10.3 Related Literature
Moscadelli (2003) also analyzes data from the 2002 LDCE, and per-
forms a thorough comparison of traditional full-data analyses and extreme
value methods for estimating the operational loss severity distribution. He
ﬁnds that extreme value theory outperforms the traditional methods in all
eight Basel Business Lines. He also ﬁnds that the severity distribution is
very heavy-tailed, and that there is a substantial diﬀerence in loss severity
across business lines.
There are several diﬀerences between the current paper and Moscadelli
(2003). First, Moscadelli (2003) aggregates the data across all banks in the
LDCE sample. In this paper, we analyze data at the individual bank level
in order to determine whether the same quantitative techniques work for a
variety of banks with diﬀerent business mixes, control infrastructures, and
geographic exposures. We believe that doing so provides a useful test of the
techniques under consideration, and also yields an indication of their ulti-
mate applicability at individual banks. Second, the current paper explores
the newly developed technique of Huisman et al. (2001) to correct for po-
tential bias in the tail parameter estimate. Third, we explore several mod-
els of the loss frequency distribution, which allows us to obtain indicative
estimates of economic capital for operational risk.
10.4 Distributions for Operational Loss Data
We begin our empirical analysis by exploring which of various empirical
approaches best ﬁts the data. In principle, we are willing to consider any
distribution with positive support as an acceptable candidate for modeling
operational loss severity. To keep the size of our tables within reason, how-
ever, we will focus on nine commonly used distributions. This section dis-
cusses the salient features of each. In section 10.6, we consider how well
these distributions describe the statistical behavior of losses in our data-
base.
Table 10.1 lists each distribution we consider, together with its density
function and its maximal moment (discussed at the end of this section). We
begin our discussion with the exponential distribution, which is one of the
simplest statistical distributions—both analytically and computationally.
The exponential distribution is frequently used to analyze duration data
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4. The following business lines were omitted: corporate ﬁnance, commercial banking,
agency services, and retail brokerage. The following event types were omitted: damage to
physical assets, business disruption, and system failure. To preserve conﬁdentiality, we do not
report the cutoﬀ that was used for inclusion of business lines and event types.(e.g., time to failure of a machine part), and is the only continuous distri-
bution characterized by a “lack of memory.” In the duration context, lack
of memory means that the time until the occurrence of an event (failure)
does not depend on the length of time that has already elapsed (time since
installation). In the operational loss context, lack of memory implies that
the distribution of excess losses over a threshold does not depend on the
value of the threshold. So if half of all losses exceeding $1 are less than $10,
then half of all losses exceeding $1 million will be less than $1,000,010
($1,000,000  $10). Such a result does not seem plausible. However, the ex-
ponential distribution arises in the context of EVT as a possible limiting
distribution for excess losses above high thresholds. For this reason (and
also because it can be transformed into other interesting distributions), we
include it in our analysis.
The Weibull distribution is a two-parameter generalization of the ex-
ponential that allows the time-until-event occurrence to depend on the
amount of time that has already elapsed. Thus, the Weibull can capture
phenomena such as “burn in,” in which the failure rate is initially high but
decreases over time. In the context of operational risk, the Weibull may be
appropriate for modeling a business line exposed to many small losses but
only a few large losses. The gamma distribution is another two-parameter
generalization of the exponential. A gamma-distributed random variable
arises as the sum of n exponentially distributed random variables. Thus, a
machine’s failure time is gamma distributed if the machine fails whenever
n components fail, and if each component’s failure time is exponentially
distributed. Like the Weibull distribution, the gamma also allows the time
until event occurrence to depend on the amount of time that has already
elapsed.
Another generalization of the exponential distribution can be obtained
by exponentiating an exponentially distributed random variable. The re-
sulting distribution is called a Type I Pareto, and can also be referred to as
480 Patrick de Fontnouvelle, Eric S. Rosengren, and John S. Jordan
Table 10.1 Parametric distributions used for modeling operational loss severity
Distribution name Density, f(x) Maximal moment
Exponential (1/b)exp(–x/b) ∞
Weibull ( x –1/  )exp(–(x/ ) ) ∞
Gamma (x/b)c–1[exp(–x/b)]/[b (c)] ∞
LogGamma [log(x)/b]c–1x–1/b–1/[b (c)] 1/b
Pareto  –1x–1/ –1 1/ 
GPD  –1(1 +  x/ )–1/ –1 1/ 
Burr ( / )x –1(1 +  x / )–1/ –1  / 
Lognormal (2 x2 2)–1/2exp{–[log(x) –  ]2/(2 2)} ∞
LogLogistic  x1/b–1/[b(1 +  x1/b)2]1 / ba log-exponential or power-law distribution. The lack of memory of the ex-
ponential distribution manifests itself as scale invariance in the Pareto dis-
tribution. Roughly speaking, scale invariance means that data “look the
same” no matter what the unit of measure (e.g., hundreds of dollars versus
millions of dollars). So in the earlier example, where half of all losses ex-
ceeding $1 were less than $10, half of all losses over $1 million would be less
than $10 million. Power-law behavior has been observed in phenomena as
disparate as city sizes, income distributions, and insurance claim amounts,
and has been an important research topic for those interested in the be-
havior of complex systems (i.e., systems consisting of agents linked via a
decentralized network rather than via a market or social planner).5 A vari-
ation of the Pareto distribution can be obtained by exponentiating a
gamma-distributed random variable instead of an exponentially distributed
random variable. The result is referred to as the Loggamma distribution.
The Pareto distribution also arises in EVT as another limiting distribu-
tion of excesses over a high threshold. In this case, the limiting distribution
is given by a two-parameter variant of the Pareto, which is known as the
Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD). One commonly used transforma-
tion of the GPD is obtained by raising a GPD-distributed variable to a
power. The result is called the Burr distribution.
Another distribution that we consider is the Lognormal, which is so
widely used that little discussion is required here. However, it is worth not-
ing that the normal distribution is appropriate for modeling variables that
arise as the sum of many diﬀerent components. It is also a worthwhile ex-
ercise to consider which types of operational losses may be characterized
in this manner. Consider, for example, losses arising from workplace safety
lapses. One could argue that the severity of these losses may be approxi-
mated by the lognormal distribution, as it is inﬂuenced by many factors, in-
cluding weather, overall health of the injured party, physical layout of the
workplace, and the type of activity involved. The ﬁnal distribution that we
consider is the loglogistic, which is obtained by exponentiating a logistic-
distributed random variable. The Loglogistic is similar to the Lognormal,
but may be more appropriate for modeling operational loss data because it
has a slightly heavier tail.
We conclude this section by classifying the distributions discussed pre-
viously according to their tail thickness. This will facilitate interpretation
of the estimation results, as the relevance of a particular distribution to
modeling operational losses will be suggestive of the relevance of other dis-
tributions with similar tail thickness. There is no commonly agreed-upon
deﬁnition of what constitutes a heavy-tailed distribution. However, one
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5. See Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997), Gabaix (1999), and references
therein.such deﬁnition can be based on a distribution’s maximal moment, which is
deﬁned as sup(r : E[x ]    ). Maximal moments for the distributions un-
der consideration are reported in table 10.1. In this paper, we will call a dis-
tribution light tailed if it has ﬁnite moments of all orders, and heavy tailed
otherwise. Under this deﬁnition, four of the distributions being considered
are light tailed (exponential, Weibull, gamma, and lognormal), and the re-
maining ﬁve distributions are heavy tailed (loggamma, Pareto, GPD, Burr,
and loglogistic).
10.5 Descriptive Analysis
This section considers several tools that provide a visual characteriza-
tion of the loss data. Suppose one has a series of observations (xi) with a
cumulative empirical distribution function denoted by F(x). A tail plot is
obtained by plotting log(1 – F[xi]) on the vertical axis against log(xi) on the
horizontal axis. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 present tail plots of the six banks’
loss data by Basel event type and Basel business line, respectively.
Many of the tail plots show linear behavior. This is quite interesting, as a
linear tail plot implies that the data are drawn from a power-law distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the slope of the plot provides a heuristic estimate of the
tail parameter, as log(1 – F[xi])  –alog(xi)  c, where cdenotes a constant.
Another feature of these plots is that the slopes associated with the seven
Basel event types preserve roughly the same ordering across banks. For ex-
ample, client’s products and business practices is one of the heaviest-tailed
event types for all of the banks where it is plotted separately. Employment
practices and workplace safety is always one of the thinnest-tailed event
types. While the tail plots by business line also suggest power-law tail be-
havior, there is no evident consistent cross-bank ordering of business lines.
We interpret this as initial evidence that risk may be better ordered by event
type, but will revisit this issue later in the paper.
Each of the tail plots also indicates a reference line with slope of –1.
Many of the plots lie near or above this line, thus implying heuristic tail-
parameter estimates of 1 or higher. These estimates highlight the short-
comings of using an overly simplistic approach to measuring operational
risk: tail parameters exceeding 1 suggest that the expected loss is inﬁnite for
many business lines and event types, and that the capital required for op-
erational risk alone could exceed the amount of capital that large banks are
currently allocating to all risks.6 We will argue in this paper that the distri-
bution of operational losses is not as heavy tailed as it ﬁrst appears, and
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6. The LDCE data suggest that a $100 billion bank could experience 500 operational losses
(exceeding $10,000) per year. If these follow a Pareto distribution with a tail parameter equal
to 1, then Monte Carlo simulation of the aggregate loss distribution indicates capital of $5 bil-
lion at the 99.9 percent soundness level. Tail parameters of greater than 1 would imply capi-
tal levels several times larger than this ﬁgure.that it is possible to obtain more plausible estimates of regulatory capital
for operational risk.
Another useful diagnostic tool is the mean excess plot. The mean excess
for a given threshold is deﬁned as the average of all losses exceeding the
threshold, minus the threshold value. The mean excess plot reports the
mean excess as a function of the threshold value. The shape of the mean ex-
cess plot varies according to the type of distribution underlying the data.
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Fig. 10.1 Tail plots of loss data by Basel Event Type
Notes: Event Types are labeled as follows. 1—Internal Fraud. 2—External Fraud. 3—Em-
ployment Practices and Workplace Safety. 4—Clients, Products, and Business Practices. 7—
Execution, Delivery, and Process Management.For example, a Pareto distribution implies a linear, upward-sloping mean
excess plot; an exponential distribution implies a horizontal linear mean
excess plot, and a lognormal distribution implies a concave, upward-
sloping mean excess plot.
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 present mean excess plots for loss data by event
type and business line, respectively. (Each curve has been rescaled in order
to display the diﬀerent business lines and event types together on one plot.
Thus, these plots cannot be used to risk-rank business lines or event types.)
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Fig. 10.2 Tail Plots of loss data by Basel Business Line
Notes: Business lines are labels as follows. 2—Trading and Sales. 3—Retail Banking. 5—Pay-
ment and Settlement. 7—Asset Management.Nearly all of the plots slope upward, which indicates tails that are heavier
than exponential. Some of the plots are linear (e.g., event type 7 for bank
B), which suggests a Pareto-like distribution. Some are concave, which sug-
gests a lognormal or Weibull-like distribution. It is also diﬃcult to estab-
lish a consistent pattern across either business line or event type. Poten-
tially, this issue would be less severe with more data.
Implications of Alternative Operational Risk Modeling Techniques 485
Fig. 10.3 Mean excess plots by Basel Event Type
Note: See ﬁg. 10.1.10.6 Fitting the Distributions
In this section, we ﬁt each of the distributions listed in table 10.1 to the
LDCE data via maximum likelihood. Results are reported separately for
each bank under consideration, and are also broken down by business line
and event type.
Table 10.2 reports probability values for Pearson’s  2 goodness-of-ﬁt
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Fig. 10.4 Mean excess plots by Basel Business Line
Note: See ﬁg. 10.2.Table 10.2 Goodness of ﬁt across Basel Business Lines and Event Types (%)
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
All observations
Burr 0.0 6.4 72.0 23.3 13.6 0.1
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0
LogGamma 0.0 1.5 64.1 33.9 1.4 0.7
LogLogistic 0.0 6.4 79.4 23.8 2.1 0.7
Lognormal 0.0 0.2 51.8 0.0 3.5 0.2
GPD 0.0 4.5 75.8 25.7 1.6 0.8
Weibull 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.7 0.0
Event type 1—Internal fraud
Burr 31.7 86.1 99.1 13.0
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Gamma 12.2 0.0 73.4 0.0
LogGamma 32.7 85.6 98.1 18.9
LogLogistic 31.8 87.4 98.1 13.6
Lognormal 35.0 86.4 98.4 13.7
GPD 33.1 87.6 95.1 13.3
Weibull 74.9 0.4 40.9 0.0
Event type 2—External fraud
Burr 0.0 10.8 6.4 13.2 1.7 0.0
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.8 0.0
LogGamma 0.3 6.5 7.6 7.3 2.8 0.0
LogLogistic 0.0 5.1 5.8 9.3 2.7 0.0
Lognormal 0.0 0.0 6.6 4.8 3.0 0.0
GPD 0.0 10.5 6.1 13.9 1.7 0.1
Weibull 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.1 9.9 0.0
Event type 3—Employment practices and workplace safety
Burr 87.2 36.7 85.0 23.0
Exponential 1.0 0.0 29.0 0.0
Gamma 66.5 0.0 86.9 0.2
LogGamma 88.1 7.8 74.7 0.2
LogLogistic 91.7 59.5 92.0 24.5
Lognormal 95.5 57.1 86.7 24.8
GPD 92.9 64.4 82.0 35.2
Weibull 87.0 0.2 85.8 7.6
Event type 4—Clients, products, and business practices
Burr 98.9 58.0 37.0
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.6 0.0 0.0
LogGamma 80.1 77.2 42.2
LogLogistic 80.8 58.6 39.0
Lognormal 81.4 36.5 40.3
GPD 76.7 57.4 34.7
Weibull 50.1 0.0 0.0Event type 7—Execution, delivery, and process management
Burr 3.0 1.1 78.9 24.7 78.1 72.6
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 0.0
LogGamma 0.8 0.4 54.7 22.3 26.6 67.1
LogLogistic 0.1 0.0 76.8 47.7 89.4 77.3
Lognormal 0.1 0.0 51.7 52.1 68.7 0.0
GPD 2.6 0.0 77.6 39.8 83.6 89.6
Weibull 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 47.1 7.1
Business line 2—Trading and sales
Burr 1.6 68.6 88.1 58.4
Exponential 0.0 0.0 1.7 12.4
Gamma 0.0 0.0 1.1 27.4
LogGamma 0.0 65.1 70.6 42.1
LogLogistic 0.0 69.7 65.3 91.8
Lognormal 0.0 67.0 18.8 86.9
GPD 0.0 70.6 25.1 58.0
Weibull 0.0 0.0 2.3 18.3
Business line 3—Retail banking
Burr 0.1 12.5 32.3 8.5 0.9 1.7
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
LogGamma 0.0 0.2 43.0 1.3 5.8 2.4
LogLogistic 0.0 0.0 35.2 0.2 5.6 3.7
Lognormal 0.0 0.0 46.9 0.0 5.5 3.8
GPD 0.1 12.5 32.2 9.0 2.4 4.7
Weibull 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 14.7 0.0
Business line 5—Payment and settlement
Burr 48.5 11.0 69.2
Exponential 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gamma 0.0 7.2 1.7
LogGamma 66.7 40.2 62.0
LogLogistic 49.4 22.7
Lognormal 63.0 38.5 63.4
GPD 45.3 11.1 66.8
Weibull 0.3 13.3 52.4
Business line 7—Asset management
Burr 64.9 84.4 30.1 20.2
Exponential 6.4 0.0 3.6 0.0
Gamma 32.3 0.0 43.4 0.0
LogGamma 31.3 79.9 15.9 17.6
LogLogistic 63.1 63.6 44.9 17.4
Lognormal 45.9 62.6 69.8 18.2
GPD 67.5 64.2 61.1 20.8
Weibull 25.7 4.5 44.8 2.3
Notes:This table reports goodness of ﬁt for each of the distributions under consideration. The
test was based on a standard chisquare procedure, except for the rounding adjustment dis-
cussed in section 10.6. The reported ﬁgures are probability values, so that a value of 5 percent
or less indicates a poor ﬁt.
Table 10.2 (continued)
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank Fstatistic.7 In general, the heavy-tailed distributions (Burr, loggamma, log-
logistic, and Pareto) seem to ﬁt the data quite well. The reported probabil-
ity values exceed 5 percent for many business lines and event types, which
suggests that we cannot reject the null that data are in fact drawn from 
the distribution under consideration. Conversely, most of the light-tailed
distributions rarely provide an adequate ﬁt to the data. This is not surpris-
ing, as the tail plots suggested that most of the data are heavy tailed. What
is somewhat surprising is the degree to which the lognormal distribution
ﬁts the data. In fact, this light-tailed distribution ﬁts the loss data for
roughly as many business lines and event types as many of the heavier-
tailed distributions.
Table 10.3 presents parameter estimation results for the GPD and log-
normal distributions. To preserve bank conﬁdentiality, we present only the
estimate of the tail parameter  for the GPD and only the value of     2/2
for the lognormal distribution. While the  2 statistics presented in table
10.2 suggested that these two distributions provide a reasonable ﬁt to the
data, the parameter estimates generally suggest the opposite. Panel A re-
ports estimates of the GPD tail parameter  . The parameter estimates are
at or above 1 for many business lines and event types, and also above 1
when data is pooled across business lines and event types. Note that a tail
parameter of 1 or higher has implausible implications for both expected
losses and regulatory capital. Panel B of table 10.3 reports the estimated
value of     2/2 for the lognormal distribution, which enables one to cal-
culate the average loss severity via the formula exp(    2/2). While esti-
mates of the average loss vary by business line and event type, one can see
that it is less than exp(0) dollars for multiple business lines and event types.
Thus, neither the Pareto nor the lognormal distribution consistently yields
plausible parameter estimates.
Because of space considerations, we do not provide parameter estimates
for the other distributions that were estimated. However, the GPD is of spe-
cial interest because of its role in EVT and the lognormal is of special in-
terest because it is the only light-tailed distribution that seems to ﬁt the data
(according to the  2 test). Parameter estimates for other heavy-tailed distri-
butions were qualitatively similar to those of the GPD, in that they had im-
plausible implications for tail thickness of the aggregate loss distribution.
10.6.1 For Which Business Lines and Event Types Can Full Data be Fit?
In this subsection, we ask whether there seem to be particular event
types for which the full-data approach might work. Losses due to employ-
ment practices and workplace safety (event type 3) are well ﬁt by most of
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7. We calculated  2 goodness-of-ﬁt tests because tests based on the empirical distribution
function can be sensitive to data rounding, which is prevalent in the LDCE data. One can ac-
commodate rounding within the  2 test by choosing bin values appropriately.the heavy-tailed distributions as well as the lognormal. Furthermore, the
parameter estimates for both the GPD and lognormal are plausible. There
are two event types (internal fraud, and clients, products, and business
practices) where several banks’ data are well ﬁt by multiple distributions,
but where the resulting parameter estimates are not plausible. External
fraud losses are not consistently well ﬁt by any distribution on a cross-bank
basis. Results for execution, delivery, and process management are less
consistent across banks, with two institutions failing the goodness-of-ﬁt
tests, but the others having good ﬁts and (perhaps) plausible parameter es-
timates.
The results are broadly similar in the case of estimation by business line.
There are two business lines (agency services, and asset management) that
pass the goodness-of-ﬁt tests, and yield plausible parameter estimates for
several banks. Another business line (retail banking) fails the ﬁt tests at
most banks, and the ﬁnal business line (payment and settlement) yields im-
plausible parameter estimates.
10.6.2 What Might Individual Banks Do?
Our discussion to this point has searched for features of operational loss
data that hold across all of the six banks in our sample. However, the mea-
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Table 10.3 Parameter estimates for the Generalized Pareto and lognormal distributions
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
A. Estimates of the tail parameter   for the GPD
All BL & ET 1.28 (0.08) 0.87 (0.03) 0.99 (0.08) 0.92 (0.07) 0.97 (0.11) 1.01 (0.03)
ET1-IntFrd 1.24 (0.36) 1.31 (0.18) 1.10 (0.38) 1.02 (0.14)
ET2-ExtFrd 1.17 (0.12) 0.79 (0.05) 0.63 (0.19) 0.69 (0.07) 0.86 (0.14) 0.93 (0.03)
ET3-EP&WS 0.50 (0.16) 0.42 (0.05) –0.15 (0.22) 0.50 (0.06)
ET4-CPBP 1.36 (0.21) 1.25 (0.15) 1.46 (0.13)
ET7-EDPM 1.42 (0.16) 0.71 (0.05) 0.94 (0.08) 1.00 (0.18) 0.96 (0.17) 0.93 (0.09)
BL2-T&S 0.68 (0.06) 1.18 (0.13) 0.49 (0.18) 0.42 (0.28)
BL3-RetBnk 1.15 (0.10) 1.09 (0.05) 0.55 (0.17) 0.94 (0.07) 0.99 (0.14) 0.93 (0.03)
BL5-P&S 1.06 (0.23) 1.07 (0.35) 1.03 (0.29)
BL7-AsstMgt 0.49 (0.20) 0.96 (0.21) 0.37 (0.18) 1.64 (0.40)
B. Estimates of   +  2/2 for the lognormal distribution
All BL & ET –6.08 >0 >0 –21.27 >0 –9.23
ET-IntFrd –9.85 >0 >0 –6.49
ET2-ExtFrd –8.35 –22.68 >0 –5.84 >0 –22.31
ET3-EP&WS >0 >0 >0 >0
ET4-CPBP >0 >0 –5.85
ET7-EDPM –9.64 >0 >0 >0 >0 –21.51
BL2-T&S >0 –3.73 >0 >0
BL3-RetBnk –13.32 –7.45 >0 –5.24 –11.77 –9.61
BL5-P&S –12.09 >0 –2.01
BL7-AsstMgt >0 >0 >0 –2.12surement of operational risk will ultimately take place at individual banks,
who may not have the luxury of seeing whether their choices and assump-
tions are also valid at other institutions. We begin our discussion by focusing
on bank F. Bank staﬀmight begin by ﬁtting one statistical distribution across
all business lines and event types, but poor goodness-of-ﬁt statistics would
quickly lead them to alternate approaches. They might consider ﬁtting a sep-
arate loss-severity distribution to each of the seven event types. However,
they would ﬁnd that losses from the most frequent event type (external
fraud) were not well modeled by any of the distributions. The next most fre-
quent event type (clients, products, and business practices) is modeled quite
well by several heavy-tailed distributions. However, they would be quite sur-
prised to ﬁnd tail-parameter estimates exceeding 1, and might conclude that
this was not a reasonable way to model operational risk. If they next at-
tempted to ﬁt separate loss-severity distributions for each business line, they
would discover that loss data for the most common business line (retail bank-
ing) were not well-modeled by any of the distributions considered.
Bank F was chosen at random for discussion. If presented with their
bank’s results from tables 10.2 and 10.3, risk management staﬀ from the
other ﬁve institutions might reach similar conclusions. They would dis-
cover that for many of the important business lines and event types, none
of the statistical distributions considered adequately captured the behav-
ior of operational losses. They would also discover that some business lines
and event types were well modeled by heavy-tailed distributions, but that
the resulting parameter estimates had implausible implications for their
overall operational risk exposure.
10.7 Threshold Analysis of Loss Data
The previous section’s results suggest that it may be diﬃcult to ﬁt para-
metric loss-severity distributions over the entire range of loss amounts,
even if separate analyses are conducted for each business line and event
type. In this section, we focus on the largest losses, as these are most rele-
vant for determining a bank’s operational risk exposure. The main theo-
retical result underlying this “Peaks Over Threshold” (POT) approach is
that if the distribution of excess losses converges to a limiting distribution
as the threshold increases, then this limiting distribution is either the ex-
ponential distribution or the generalized Pareto distribution.
Implementation of the POT approach begins with choosing an estima-
tor for the tail index parameter  , the most common being the Hill estima-
tor. The appeal of this estimator derives from its conceptual and computa-
tional simplicity. For a set of losses exceeding a given threshold, the Hill
estimator equals the average of the log of the losses minus the log of the
threshold. If the underlying loss distribution is a Type I Pareto, then the
Hill estimator is the maximum likelihood estimate of the tail thickness
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hood ratio tests of various hypotheses.
Let k denote the number of observations exceeding a given threshold
value. The quantity kis often referred to as the number of exceedances.Fig-
ure 10.5 presents plots of the Hill estimator for the six banks under con-
sideration. The solid black line represents the Hill estimator calculated
across all business lines and all event types for various values of k between
1 and 200. Traditionally, the ﬁnal estimate of the tail index parameter has
depended heavily on the choice of k. However, Huisman, Koedijk, Kool,
and Palm (2001; hereafter HKKP) have recently proposed a regression-
based enhancement to the Hill estimator that minimizes the role of thresh-
old selection. HKKP note that the Hill estimator is biased in small
samples, and that the bias is approximately linear in k, so that
(1) E( (k))    ck,
where  (k) denotes the Hill estimator calculated using k exceedances, and
  denotes the true value of the tail index parameter. HKKP use equation
(1) to motivate the following regression
(2)  (k)    0    1k   ε(k),
which is estimated for k in (1, . . . , K). The estimate of  0 is interpreted as
a bias-corrected estimate of  . This method also requires the researcher to
choose the number of exceedances to include in the analysis. However,
HKKP conclude that the estimate of  0 is robust to the choice of k.
We apply the HKKP technique to the six Hill plots presented in ﬁgure
10.5. The results are presented in table 10.4.
The second column reports the number of exceedances (K) that were
used to estimate the above regression. HKKP suggest setting K equal to
half the sample size N, and also note that the function  (k) should be ap-
proximately linear over the range k   (1, . . . , K). In results not reported,
we found that setting K   N/2 would not be appropriate, as none of the six
Hill plots were linear over such a wide range.8 However, each of the plots
in ﬁgure 10.5 do indicate a range of k over which  (k) is approximately lin-
ear. We have chosen K accordingly.
The third column of table 10.4 reports the estimate of  0 that was ob-
tained using the optimal K. The estimates vary between 0.50 and 0.86,
which implies that the maximal moment   1/  varies between 1.16 and
2.00. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the intuition that operational losses have a
heavy-tailed severity distribution. The parameter estimates in the third col-
umn of table 10.4 are used in simulations of the aggregate loss distribution
reported in section 10.9, table 10.5.
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8. To preserve the banks’ conﬁdentiality, we do not report Hill plots using either N or N/2
exceedances, as doing so would reveal the number of losses at each bank.The last row of the table reports results obtained for a sample consisting
of all six banks. Interestingly, the resulting parameter estimate of 0.68 is
consistent with the results of de Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), who reported
tail-parameter estimates of about 0.65. This consistency is remarkable,
given that de Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) used external, publicly reported
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Fig. 10.5 Hill plots of the tail index parameter
Notes: The following are Hill plots of the tail index parameter for the six banks under con-
struction. The thick dark line indicates the point estimates of the tail parameter as the num-
ber of exceedances varies between 1 and 200. The thin dark lines indicate 95 percent con-
ﬁdence intervals for the point estimates. The thick, medium gray (light gray) line indicates
P-values for the Likelihood Ratio test of the hypothesis that the tail parameter is constant
across business lines (event types).loss data (rather than internal data), as well as substantially diﬀerent em-
pirical techniques than the current paper.
The ﬁnal three columns of table 10.4 report tail-index estimates obtained
using diﬀerent numbers of exceedances in the regression procedure of
HKKP. For all six banks, the results do not change materially when the
number of exceedances is reduced from K to 0.75K or 0.5K. The results
change more when 0.25K exceedances are used. Overall, table 10.4 con-
ﬁrms that the estimation results are not highly sensitive to the choice of K.
10.7.1 Estimation by Business Line and Event Type
Our Hill plot analyses have thus far taken place at the “top of the house”
level, where data are aggregated across both business line and event type.
However, one might ask whether this approach is appropriate, or whether
the tail behavior of the loss-severity distribution might vary by business
line and event type. To investigate this issue, we calculated for each value of
k (the number of exceedances) separate Hill estimators for each business
line and event type. For each k, we then calculated likelihood ratio test sta-
tistics for the hypothesis that the tail index is constant across business lines
and that it is constant across event types. The probability values for these
statistics are reported graphically in ﬁgure 10.5. The results indicate that
both hypotheses can sometimes be rejected at the 10 percent level when 
k is near 200. However, neither hypothesis can be rejected at the 10 percent
level for values of k where the Hill estimator is constant (banks A, C, and
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Table 10.4 Tail parameter estimates based on the HKKP method
No. of exceedances used in estimation
Bank ID Optimal KK 0.75K 0.5K 0.25K
A 180 0.823 0.794 0.817 0.717
(0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.042)
B 80 0.628 0.591 0.565 0.313
(0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.016)
C 30 0.859 0.824 0.952 1.032
(0.085) (0.097) (0.182) (0.353)
D 50 0.498 0.405 0.456 0.415
(0.019) (0.015) (0.028) (0.039)
E 200 0.552 0.534 0.558 0.488
(0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018)
F 50 0.633 0.538 0.536 0.342
(0.030) (0.019) (0.038) (0.026)
All 140 0.681 0.554 0.419 0.305
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015)
Notes: This table reports tail index estimates calculated under the HKKP regression algo-
rithm. The optimal number of exceedances (K) is chosen to correspond to the linear portion
of the Hill plot. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.E) or decreasing (banks B, D, and F). Because choosing a small k provides
a less biased value of the Hill estimator, segregating the analysis by business
line or event type does not seem to be called for. This ﬁnding does not mean
that tail behavior of operational losses is constant across business lines and
event types. Rather, the ability of statistical estimation techniques to mean-
ingfully diﬀerentiate tail behavior across business lines is hindered by a lack
of data on large losses using only internal data for one year, and by the con-
centration of these data in one or two business lines and event types.
10.7.2 On the Possibility of Thin-Tailed Severity Distributions
The results presented in table 10.4 suggest that loss-severity distribu-
tions at the six banks under consideration have tail indexes ranging be-
tween 0.50 and 0.86. The reported standard errors also seem to exclude the
possibility that   0, which would indicate a thin-tailed loss distribution.
However, the Hill estimator is designed for situations where   0. Thus, it
cannot be used to reject the hypothesis of a thin-tailed loss distribution.
This is an interesting hypothesis, because thin-tailed distributions, such as
the lognormal, could have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent implications for capital
than fatter-tailed distributions, such as the Pareto.
Dekkers, Einmahl, and de Haan (1989) show how to extend the Hill es-
timator so that it is valid for any   in  . The graph of this estimator as k
varies is commonly referred to as a DEdH plot. Figure 10.6reports DEdH
plots for the six banks under consideration. These plots indicate that for
the low values of k for which the Hill estimator was constant or decreas-
ing, we cannot reject the null of a thin-tailed severity distribution at any of
the six banks. This is problematic. The choice of fat versus thin tailed loss
severity distribution will have signiﬁcant impact on the capital calculation,
yet based on limited data for only one year, available statistical techniques
provide little guidance on which choice is more appropriate. We expect that
as banks accumulate more data on large losses, the DEdH plots will either
be able to reject the null of   0 or will indicate tail estimates close enough
to zero that the choice does not matter so much. For now, we explore the
empirical consequences of assuming a thin-tailed loss severity distribution.
Extreme value theory suggests that the exponential distribution is an ap-
propriate choice for modeling loss severity under the thin-tailed assump-
tion. Thus, we wish to construct a threshold plot showing how the expo-
nential parameter varies as the threshold increases (k decreases). Because
the maximum likelihood estimate of this parameter is given by the mean
excess, these threshold plots would be identical to the mean excess plots al-
ready presented in ﬁgures 10.3 and 10.4. As discussed earlier, the mean ex-
cess plots suggest that the exponential distribution does not provide an ac-
curate description of the tail behavior of operational losses. All six banks’
excess plots are concave and increasing, whereas exponentially distributed
data imply a linear and horizontal excess plot.
Implications of Alternative Operational Risk Modeling Techniques 495Since the DEdH plots do suggest that tail behavior of operational losses
might be modeled with a light-tailed distribution, we consider whether
some other such distribution provides a better ﬁt to the data than the ex-
ponential. Because the log-normal was the one light-tailed distribution in-
vestigated in section 10.6 that provided a good ﬁt across multiple banks,
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Fig. 10.6 DEdH plots of the tail index parameter
Notes: The following are DEdH plots of the tail index parameter for the six banks under con-
sideration. The solid line indicates the point estimates of the tail parameter as the number of
exceedances varies between 1 and 500. The dotted lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence inter-
vals for the point estimates.business lines, and event types, we investigate whether it might also provide
a useful description of the tail behavior of operational losses.
Figures 10.7 and 10.8present threshold plots for the six banks, under the
assumption that losses above high thresholds follow a (truncated) lognor-
mal distribution. For each value of k(the number of exceedances), estimates
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Fig. 10.7 Threshold plots of the lognormal parameter  
Notes: The following are threshold plots of the lognormal parameter   for the six banks un-
der consideration. The solid line indicates the point estimates of   as the number of ex-
ceedances varies between 10 and 200. The dotted lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals
for the point estimates. Labels are omitted from the vertical axis to preserve conﬁdentiality.of the lognormal parameters were obtained via maximum likelihood. (Ver-
tical axis scales have been omitted to protect data conﬁdentiality. However,
a reference line in ﬁgure 10.7 indicates the location of   0.) One can dis-
cern a common pattern in the estimates of  and  across all six banks. For
example, consider the plots for bank B. Both suggest that the lognormal is
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Fig. 10.8 Threshold plots of the lognormal parameter  
Notes: The following are threshold plots of the lognormal parameter  for the six banks under
consideration. The solid line indicates the point estimates of   as the number of exceedances
varies between 10 and 200. The dotted lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for the
point estimates. Labels are omitted from the vertical axis to preserve conﬁdentiality.not a good ﬁt for more than 100 exceedances, in that the estimates are un-
stable as kvaries and the point estimate for  is less than 0. We have already
argued that this is not a reasonable characterization of operational loss
data. However, parameter estimates are both stable and reasonable when
thirty to seventy exceedances are used for estimation. The   estimate lies
between 4 and 8, while the   estimate lies between 0 and 2.9 Three of the
other banks display a similar pattern, with stable (and reasonable) param-
eter estimates emerging over high thresholds. The two remaining banks’ (C
and E) POT plots become unstable for small numbers of exceedances.
In results not reported, we chose a speciﬁc number of exceedances K for
each of the six banks reported in ﬁgures 7 and 8, such that the estimates of
 and  are stable for k K.10(This procedure follows the traditional anal-
ysis of the Hill plot as discussed in Embrechts, Klüppelburg, and Mikosch,
1997). The resulting estimates of   and   are used in simulations of the ag-
gregate loss distribution reported in section 10.9, table 10.5.
10.8 The Operational Loss Frequency Distribution
We have thus far focused on the loss severity distribution, which de-
scribes the potential size of an operational loss, given that the loss has oc-
curred. Operational risk capital will also depend on the loss frequency dis-
tribution, which describes how many losses might actually occur over a
given time period. The Poisson distribution is a natural starting point for
modeling loss frequency because it arises whenever the loss occurrence rate
is constant over time. We thus begin by modeling frequency at bank iby the
following:
(3) ni ~ Po( i)
That the Poisson distribution has only one parameter makes it particularly
attractive in the current context. The LDCE does not provide information
regarding the date of an event, beyond the knowledge that all losses oc-
curred sometime during the year 2001. Thus, we have enough information
to estimate the Poisson parameter, but not enough to estimate multipara-
meter frequency distributions. Maximum likelihood estimates of the pa-
rameter   are given by the annual number of loss events.11
An interesting property of a Poisson variable is that the mean and vari-
ance are equal. So if a LDCE bank were to report 10,000 loss events for the
year 2001, we would expect (with 95 percent probability) it to report be-
tween 9,800 and 10,200 events the following year. On an intuitive level, this
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9. The actual range of variation is signiﬁcantly narrower, but has not been reported, so as
to protect data conﬁdentiality.
10. These results were not reported because estimates of   and   would reveal conﬁdential
information regarding the loss-severity distribution at individual institutions.
11. To preserve conﬁdentiality, we have not reported the number of loss events.seems like a very narrow range, and one might ask whether frequency
should be modeled via a distribution permitting more variability than the
Poisson. One such distribution is the negative binomial, which is a com-
monly used generalization of the Poisson.
As was discussed earlier, the LDCE data do not support estimation of
two-parameter frequency distributions at the individual bank level. In or-
der to model excess dispersion in the loss frequency distribution, we take a
cross-sectional approach. That is, we estimate the following regression:
(4) ni ~ F(Xi, b),
where F( )is a discrete nonnegative-valued distribution, Xiis an observable
characteristic of bank i (e.g., asset size), and b is a parameter vector. Be-
cause our data set is purely cross-sectional (i.e., there is no time series ele-
ment), we cannot estimate any ﬁxed eﬀects. Fixed eﬀects represent bank-
speciﬁc variation in the frequency of operational losses, which could arise
from factors such as the quality of an individual bank’s risk control envi-
ronment. However, it is worth nothing that equation (3) can be interpreted
as a ﬁxed eﬀects model. Seen in this light, equations (3) and (4) are diﬀer-
ent but complementary ways of treating the ﬁxed eﬀects issue. Under the
latter, the expected number of events is purely a function of a bank’s ob-
servable characteristics, whereas under the former, the expected number of
events is purely bank speciﬁc.
We begin by estimating equation (4) under the assumption that F( ) is
the Poisson distribution, so that ni ~ PO(mean   bXi). Setting each Xi as
bank i’s total assets as of year-end 2001, we obtain an estimate of 8.2 for
the parameter b. This indicates that banks in our sample reported on aver-
age 8.2 operational events for every billion dollars in assets. Next, we esti-
mate equation (4) under the assumption that F( ) is the negative binomial
distribution, so that ni ~ NB(mean   b1Xi, dispersion   b2). We obtain an
estimate of 7.4 for b1 and 0.43 for b2.
10.9 The Aggregate Loss Distribution
In this section, we combine the severity results of section 10.7 with the
frequency results of section 10.8 in order to estimate economic capital for
operational risk, which is speciﬁed as the 99.9th percentile of the aggregate
loss distribution. We explore two alternate assumptions regarding the loss
frequency distribution: the Poisson and negative binomial distributions, 
as estimated in section 10.8. We also explore three diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the tail of the loss-severity distribution: the Pareto as estimated
in section 10.7 (table 10.4), the lognormal as estimated in section 10.7b,
and the empirical distribution.
We use Monte Carlo simulation to derive an estimate of the aggregate
loss distribution as follows. In the case of the empirical severity distribu-
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frequency distribution, and is denoted Ni. Then, Ni individual losses 
(l[1], ...,   l[Ni]) are drawn from the empirical distribution. The Ni losses
are summed to obtain the aggregate loss for year i. This process is repeated
for one million simulated years in order to obtain the aggregate loss distri-
bution.
Monte Carlo simulation for the Pareto (lognormal) severity distribution
proceeds similarly, except that losses in (l[1], . . . , l[Ni]) greater than or
equal to the relevant threshold value are replaced with random draws from
the Pareto (lognormal) distribution estimated in section 10.6.12 The Ni
losses are then summed to obtain the aggregate loss for year i, and the pro-
cess is repeated for one million simulated years in order to obtain the ag-
gregate loss distribution. The use of Monte Carlo techniques in the current
context has already been extensively documented, and we refer readers in-
terested in further details to Klugman, Panjer, and Wilmot (1998) and Em-
brechts, Kaufmann, and Samorodnitsky (2002), and to their references.
10.9.1 Simulations Based on a Poisson Frequency Distribution
In this subsection, we assume that the frequency of operational losses
follows a Poisson distribution with a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, as in equa-
tion (3). We make three diﬀerent assumptions for loss severity: the Pareto,
the lognormal, and the empirical distribution. Results are presented in
panel A of table 10.5. To preserve the conﬁdentiality of the banks in the
sample, we scaled each percentile for each bank by that bank’s assets. The
cross-bank median for each percentile is then reported.
In 2001, the Basel Committee conducted a quantitative impact study
covering 140 banks in twenty-four countries. The committee reported that
the median (mean) ratio of reported operational risk capital to minimum
regulatory capital was 12.8 percent (15.3 percent), and concluded that “a
reasonable level of the overall operational risk capital charge would be
about 12 percent of minimum regulatory capital.”13 If one estimates mini-
mum regulatory capital to be 5 percent of a bank’s assets, then a reason-
able benchmark value for operational risk capital would be 0.6 percent of
assets. The median value of 0.468 percent reported in Panel A (for the
99.9th percentile) seems roughly consistent with this benchmark. It is also
worth noting that our estimation is based solely on internal loss data for
one year, providing limited data to estimate high-severity losses. Banks are
also using external loss data and scenario analysis to provide additional
information on the tail where they have insuﬃcient high-severity losses in
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12. For the lognormal distribution, the relevant threshold is the same as that used for esti-
mation of the tail parameter. For the Pareto distribution, the relevant threshold is the largest
observed loss value. This is because by construction, the HKKP tail-parameter estimate  0
corresponds to zero exceedances.
13. See page 26 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).a particular business line. Thus, we would view the ﬁgure of 0.468 percent
as a lower bound on the banks’ true operational risk exposure.
The next set of simulations is conducted under the assumption that the
severity of operational losses follows a lognormal distribution. The results
suggest that cross-bank median of the 99.9th percentile is 0.07 percent of
assets. This ﬁgure seems small in comparison with both that obtained in
the Pareto-based simulations and with the 0.6 percent benchmark dis-
cussed previously.
We conducted the ﬁnal set of simulations by drawing the number of loss
events from a Poisson distribution and the loss amounts from the empiri-
cal severity distribution. One may think of the resulting 99.9th percentiles
as a lower bound on the true capital requirement. Alternatively, one may
think of these percentiles as representing the portion of capital that derives
from banks’ actual loss experience, rather than from their exposure—as
measured by a ﬁtted distribution function, which would also include infor-
mation from external data and scenario analysis. Because the lognormal 
is a thin-tailed distribution, the 99.9th percentile based on the lognormal
severity distribution exceeds that based on the empirical distribution by
about 20 percent. Because the Pareto is a heavy-tailed distribution, the
99.9th percentile based on the Pareto severity distribution exceeds that
based on the empirical distribution by a factor of eight.
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Table 10.5 Quantiles of the simulated aggregate loss distribution
Percentiles of the aggregate loss distribution (%)
Severity distribution 95 99 99.9
A. Poisson frequency distribution—ﬁxed effects model
Pareto 0.066 0.117 0.468
Lognormal 0.047 0.056 0.070
Empirical 0.047 0.053 0.058
B. Poisson frequency distribution—cross-sectional model
Pareto 0.106 0.148 0.362
Lognormal 0.089 0.101 0.121
Empirical 0.086 0.093 0.102
C. Negative binomial frequency distribution—cross-sectional model
Pareto 0.166 0.237 0.400
Lognormal 0.143 0.198 0.273
Empirical 0.146 0.202 0.273
Notes: This table reports quantiles of the simulated aggregate loss distribution. To preserve
the conﬁdentiality of the banks in the sample, we scale each percentile for each bank by that
bank’s assets. The cross-bank median for each percentile is then reported. Panel A presents
results under the assumption that loss frequency follows a Poisson distribution whose pa-
rameter is estimated separately for each bank (ﬁxed-effects model). Panel B presents results
under the assumption that loss frequency follows a Poisson distribution whose parameter is a
linear function of each bank’s asset size (cross-sectional model). Panel C presents results un-
der the assumption that loss frequency follows a negative binomial distribution whose pa-
rameter is a linear function of each bank’s asset size (cross-sectional model).10.9.2 Simulations Based on a Negative Binomial
Frequency Distribution
In the previous section, we assumed that the frequency of operational
losses followed a Poisson distribution. We found that assuming a Pareto
severity distribution yielded capital estimates that were broadly consistent
with the Basel Committee’s expectation that operational risk accounts for
12 percent of minimum regulatory capital. Assuming a lognormal severity
distribution yielded markedly lower capital estimates. In this section, we
investigate how these results change under the assumption that the fre-
quency of operational losses follows a negative binomial distribution, as
was discussed in section 10.8.
Panels B and C of table 10.5 report quantiles of aggregate loss distribu-
tions that were simulated using cross-sectional frequency models based on
the Poisson and negative binomial distributions, respectively. (Note that
the cross-sectional Poisson model is included because it is not informative
to directly compare the cross-sectional negative binomial results with the
ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson results, as diﬀerences could be due to either diﬀer-
ences in the handling of eﬀects or to diﬀerences in the assumed frequency
distribution.) The negative binomial speciﬁcation implies signiﬁcantly
more variability in the number of operational losses than does the Poisson
speciﬁcation. Thus, intuition suggests that the aggregate loss distribution
should have a heavier tail under the negative binomial speciﬁcation. This
intuition proves correct in the case of the lognormal severity distribution.
The median 99.9th percentile is about twice as large under the negative bi-
nomial as under the cross-sectional Poisson speciﬁcation. However, intu-
ition proves incorrect in the case of the Pareto distribution, for which the
median 99.9th percentile is not materially diﬀerent under the negative bi-
nomial than under the Poisson.14
Under the negative binomial speciﬁcation of loss frequency, it is diﬃcult
to decide whether the Pareto or the lognormal provides the more useful
characterization of the loss-severity distribution. The diﬀerence between
the two sets of results is within an order of magnitude that may be consid-
ered close given the preliminary nature of the data and techniques.
10.10 Conclusion
This paper examines operational risk modeling using only internal oper-
ational loss data. By focusing on internal data, it captures the potential
modeling issues faced by banking organizations that have only recently
started to collect comprehensive loss data. The analysis indicates that the
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14. It has been argued that intuition can be misleading if risks follow very heavy-tailed
Pareto-type distributions (e.g., Embrechts, McNeill, and Straumann 2002, Rootzen and
Klüppelberg 1999).data do show statistical regularities, and that the severity ranking of event
types is similar across banks. The analysis also shows that the data is rea-
sonably ﬁt by heavy-tailed distributions (such as the Pareto), and illustrates
that certain statistical methods yield plausible tail-parameter estimates for
these heavy-tailed distributions. In fact, the tail-parameter estimates for the
severity distribution are quite close to the estimates based on publicly avail-
able time series of high-severity losses (de Fontnouvelle et al. 2003).
It is important to qualify our results by noting that they are based on
only one year of loss data. This limited data makes it diﬃcult to distinguish
between diﬀerent distributional assumptions, though some thin-tailed dis-
tributions do appear inconsistent with the data. At this point, we would
conclude that a variety of threshold-based techniques seem to yield results
that are consistently plausible across banks. However, we may need to
await the arrival of better data before making more deﬁnitive conclusions.
As banks obtain three or more years of good operational loss data, the
ability to diﬀerentiate across alternative distributional assumptions should
improve.
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Comment Andrew Kuritzkes
Until recently, operational risk was hard enough to deﬁne, let alone quan-
tify. One of the undoubted beneﬁts of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel
II) for international bank capital regulation is that it has standardized the
deﬁnition of operational risk, at least for the banking industry.1 Basel II
requires banks around the world to collect internal data on operational
losses—deﬁned to include losses resulting from the failure of “internal
processes, people, or systems” or from external events—and classify losses
into one of seven categories.2 As a result of this mandatory data collection
eﬀort, it is now becoming increasingly possible to analyze the behavior of
operational losses systematically, within a commonly accepted deﬁnitional
framework.
Once we are in a position to deﬁne operational risk, the next question be-
comes whether we can measure it. The ability to quantify operational risk
has important policy implications, because Basel II bases a new regulatory
capital charge for operational risk on banks’ internal modeling of opera-
tional losses. Under Basel II’s “Advanced Measurement Approach,” in-
ternationally active banks will be required to estimate their exposure to
operational losses over a one-year time horizon at the 99.9th percentile
level. The regulatory capital charge for operational risk will then be set
equivalent to a bank’s internal estimate of the tail risk at the 99.9th per-
centile, or a one-in-one-thousand-year outcome. Overall, the Basel Com-
mittee responsible for developing the new bank capital rules expects that
this bottom-up calculation of operational risk capital will comprise about
12 percent of total bank regulatory capital. By comparison, the expected
operational risk capital requirement is more than ﬁve times the regulatory
capital charge for market risk that was introduced for banks in the mid-
1990s.3
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I would like to thank Mark Ames of Mercer Oliver Wyman for his help in preparing this
comment. Any errors or omissions are my responsibility.
1. See Kuritzkes (2002) for a discussion of the diﬃculties of deﬁning operational risk, and
implications for quantiﬁcation.
2. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).
3. According to a recent study by Beverly Hirtle of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the median market risk capital charge for nineteen U.S. bank holding companies subject to
Basel’s market risk amendment ranged from 1.0 percent to 2.3 percent of required regulatory
capital on a quarterly basis from 1998 through 2001. See Hirtle 2005.Within this context, de Fontnouvelle, Rosengren, and Jordan, working
together at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, seek to assess how bank
operational losses can be modeled from internal data sets. Narrowly, their
focus is on whether the techniques of Extreme Value Theory (EVT) can be
successfully applied to estimate operational risk distributions for individ-
ual banks using internal loss data. The analysis follows from a previous
study by the same authors and another colleague (de Fontnouvelle et al.
2003) that applied an EVT approach to two external databases of publicly
reported operational losses for the banking industry. That study concluded
that a generalized Pareto distribution appeared to ﬁt an aggregate opera-
tional loss distribution well.
Signiﬁcantly, in this paper, the authors extend their analysis to a conﬁ-
dential set of bank-level data collected by the Federal Reserve as part of
Basel II’s second Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 2). Through QIS 2, the
authors are able to analyze the internal loss distributions of six large, in-
ternationally active banks that were deemed to have comprehensive data
sets for 2001, the year of the impact study. Given conﬁdentiality restric-
tions, de Fontnouvelle et al. need to protect the anonymity of the six banks
in their sample, and they take care in reporting results not to reveal infor-
mation that could be used to identify the institutions.
The authors make excellent use of their access to the regulatory dataset
to provide a unique window on estimation techniques for modeling opera-
tional risk. Speciﬁcally, they are concerned with three main questions:
1. Are operational losses best characterized by a thin-tailed (e.g., log-
normal), or fat-tailed (e.g., Pareto) distribution?
2. Are the shapes of these distributions consistent across individual
banks?
3. Do the results provide a reasonable basis for allocating regulatory
capital?
Aﬃrmative answers to the ﬁrst two questions lead to a tentative yes to
the third: to the extent that operational losses are fat tailed and can be
modeled by a Pareto distribution, then tail estimates of operational risk at
the 99.9 percent level are more likely to fall within the expected range for
regulatory capital. And to the extent that the same modeling approach can
be shown to generate consistent results across the six banks in the sample,
the more conﬁdent we can be that reliance on internal models will not lead
to random diﬀerences in capital requirements for similar institutions.
In addressing these questions, de Fontnouvelle et al. need to overcome
two challenges.
First, since operational risk capital is deﬁned at a point in the tail of the
loss distribution, by deﬁnition there will be a paucity of data on extreme
losses (99.9 percent events) within any one institution. This is particularly
true when looking at a one-year time horizon (although the problem per-
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has been the case with many of the large banks preparing for Basel II im-
plementation). If a bank experiences an extreme loss within the measure-
ment period, is this a sign that it is intrinsically more prone to control
breakdowns and operational failures, or has the bank just been unlucky?
The measurement problem is most acute in the tail—the region of rele-
vance for setting operational risk capital.
Second, observable operational losses are characterized by a large mode
of high-frequency, low-severity events, and they appear to ﬁt a lognormal
distribution well. This is evident in Figure 10C.1, which shows a ﬁtted log-
normal distribution plotted against empirically observed losses for a large
international bank, based on ﬁve years of the bank’s operational loss his-
tory. (Like the authors, I cannot reveal the identity of this bank for conﬁ-
dentiality reasons.) A quick visual check reveals that the ﬁt is quite good.
Similarly, the authors’ own data show how close a lognormal distribution
comes to the empirically observed data across the six banks in their study.
As summarized in table 10C.1, the lognormal estimates of severity under
three diﬀerent frequency-estimation techniques fall within 9 percent of the
observed empirical values at the 99th percentile.
Yet if operational risk is appropriately characterized by a lognormal dis-
tribution, the resulting capital estimates will be too “low” to be reason-
able. To see this, I have, in table 10C.2, normalized the authors’ estimate of
the 99.9 percent loss from the lognormal distribution under each of their
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Fig. 10C.1 Lognormal versus empirical ﬁt for a large international bank 
Note: Based on ﬁve years of internal operational loss data.frequency-estimation approaches (which the authors report as a percent-
age of total assets) to the 5 percent Basel II regulatory capital-to-asset ra-
tio suggested by the authors.4 On this basis, the implied regulatory capital
charge for operational risk would range from 1.40 percent to 5.46 percent
of total Basel II regulatory capital—signiﬁcantly lower than the Basel
Committee’s expectation that operational risk capital would account for
roughly 12 percent of total regulatory capital.
De Fontnouvelle et al. marshal an impressive array of counterevidence
to demonstrate that operational losses should be modeled with a fat-tailed
distribution. Their argument follows ﬁve main steps.
1. For capital purposes, we are not concerned with the mode of the dis-
tribution, but with the tail at the 99.9 percent level.
2. Extreme Value Theory and experience in modeling risks that are sim-
ilar to operational losses, such as catastrophe risks in insurance, suggests
that tails can behave very diﬀerently from the body of the distribution.
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4. It would be more convenient if the authors reported the results scaled by risk-weighted
assets rather than by total bank assets, since total Basel II regulatory capital is deﬁned as a
ﬁxed percentage (8 percent) of risk-weighted assets. For consistency, I have adopted the au-
thors’ suggestion that total regulatory capital is around 5 percent of total assets in normaliz-
ing the results.
Table 10C.1 Lognormal severity versus empirical observations: Aggregate loss
distribution across six banks (%)
99th percentile, 99th percentile, 
Frequency estimation approach empirical ﬁt lognormal estimate
Poisson ﬁxed effects .053 .056
Poisson cross-sectional .093 .101
Negative binomial .202 .198
Source: De Fontnouvelle et al., table 5.
Note: Scaled as a percentage of bank assets.
Table 10C.2 Lognormal estimates at 99.9 percent
99.9th percentile
Frequency estimation approach (as percent of regulatory capital)
Poisson ﬁxed effects 1.40
Poisson cross-sectional 2.42
Negative binomial 5.46
Source: De Fontnouvelle et al., Table 5.
Note: Scaled relative to 5 percent total regulatory capital to assets.3. Proﬁling of operational loss data for each of the six banks in their
sample by tail plots, average excess plots, and chi-square tests indicates
that fat-tailed distributions generally outperform thin-tailed distributions.
4. Using the EVT-based peaks-over-threshold approach developed by
Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (HKKP 2001), a Pareto distribution
appears to provide a strong ﬁt in the tail for all six banks.
5. The results are consistent with the previous paper by de Fontnouvelle
and colleagues on publicly reported operational losses.
Taken together, the evidence is persuasive that operational losses are in-
deed fat tailed. For practitioners interested in the behavior of the distribu-
tion at around the 99.9 percent level—in particular, bank risk managers
and regulators—modeling the operational risk tail using a peaks-over-
threshold approach and a generalized Pareto distribution oﬀers a promis-
ing solution.
Turning to the paper’s second question, do the estimates across individ-
ual banks converge? Here we are hampered by the aggregation of results
necessary to protect the anonymity of the six banks studied. The authors
are not able to report the regulatory capital estimate at the 99.9 percent
level for each of the six banks in the study without risking disclosure of
conﬁdential information, so instead they report the median result across
the six banks (after scaling each bank’s results by total assets). This is the
basis on which they conclude that “the median value of .468 percent (of as-
sets, equivalent to 9.36 percent of total regulatory capital) reported (see the
author’s table 10.5) for the 99.9th percentile seems reasonable” in compar-
ison to regulatory expectations.
But while the authors do not report individual loss estimates for the six
banks, they do report the shape parameter,  , for the generalized Pareto
distribution for each bank under the HKKP estimation. The  ’s range from
a low of .498 to a high of .859, with a combined aggregate value for the six
banks of .681. The diﬀerence in shape parameters actually implies a very
wide range in tail estimates at the individual bank level.
To illustrate the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the shape parameter, my col-
league, Mark Ames, and I calculated regulatory capital at the 99.9 percent
level across the six values of  for hypothetical banks whose exposures were
otherwise identical. For each bank we assumed twenty operational loss ex-
ceedances per year above a $1 MM threshold, and a value of $0.75 MM for
the GPD beta. The threshold and beta values were chosen to be broadly
consistent with de Fontnouvelle and colleagues’ work in their previous
study (de Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). The results are reported in table 10C.3.
Diﬀerences in the shape parameter appear to have a signiﬁcant impact
on an individual bank’s tail risk. The estimates for our hypothetical bank
show that for twenty exceedances above $1 MM, if the shape parameter
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If the shape parameter were as high as .859 the 99.9th percentile loss esti-
mate would be $4.3 billion. This twenty-to-one range is consistent with the
ﬁndings of de Fontnouvelle and colleagues’ previous study (de Fontnou-
velle et al. 2003) based on externally reported operational losses. From a
regulatory perspective, the key question is how conﬁdent can we be in each
bank’s own estimate—based solely on internal data—of its shape param-
eter. Do such apparently large diﬀerences in the shapes of the tail reﬂect
true diﬀerences in banks’ vulnerability to operational losses, or are they ar-
tifacts of measurement?
An order-of-magnitude range may not be that surprising for an attempt
to estimate the one-in-one-thousand-year tail risk of operational loss,
given that the authors were only able to work with a single year’s worth of
data for each of the six banks. More generally, the range in magnitude is a
reﬂection of the early stage of development of operational risk measure-
ment. No doubt future research across more banks and on longer datasets
will help narrow the range.
In light of the diﬀerences in the shape parameter, can we say that the re-
sults provide a reasonable basis for allocating capital to individual banks?
In my view, the answer is that it is too early to tell. Until we know more
about the behavior of tail estimates at the individual bank level, we will not
know whether diﬀerences in operational risk capital calculations across
banks reﬂect true diﬀerences in their loss experience and control environ-
ment, or the limitations of using sparse data to forecast extreme events.
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Table 10C.3 Regulatory capital as a function of tail density
Regulatory capital estimate
Sample Value of shape parameter   at 99.9 percent in $MMs
Bank D 0.498 208
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Discussion Summary
Part of the discussion revolved around the paucity of observations in the
tails of loss distributions, both currently and going forward. Eric Rosen-
gren noted that the tail is more populated for some banks than others and
that such variation may be a source of the variation in estimated tail-index
values that the authors observe. He also noted that under Basel II’s ad-
vanced-measurement approach, banks are not limited to internal data, but
also may use external data and scenario analysis. Patricia Jackson won-
dered whether Basel II’s loss-size cutoﬀ for data collection might be raised
to reduce costs, but Ken Abbott observed that, in his experience, small
losses may be indicative of process problems that might result in very large
losses under other circumstances. Thus, there should be a role for judg-
ment in internal reporting of small losses.
Darrell Duﬃe suggested that the authors might take a Bayesian ap-
proach to dealing with a potential censorship problem in their data: losses
are capped at the level of a ﬁrm’s capital, because only surviving ﬁrms con-
tribute observations to operational risk-loss databases. Casper de Vries
suggested that the authors could use bootstrap methods in determining the
optimal number of observations to use in tail estimation, that they use the
empirical distribution in estimating losses occurring in the body of the dis-
tribution rather than the lognormal, and that variation in constant terms
may account for the variation in tail-index estimates that they observe.
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